I. Introduction
At the time of this writing there were widespread concerns about the health of the U.S. economy. There is conclusive evidence that the pace of growth has slowed, which has prompted the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates on two occasions (a total of 100 basis, thus far). As usual, when faced with this kind of turning point, analysts and policy makers alike wonder whether the United States will achieve a "soft landing" or whether the downturn is more serious and protracted--in the worst scenario, the new weakness could signal the end of the new economy. Furthermore, recent inflation surprises have not been encouraging, as higher-than expected inflation numbers may hamper the Federal Reserve's desire and ability to act countercyclically.
In this paper, we do not attempt to provide any insights into what lies ahead for the U.S. economy. Our focus is on gaining a better understanding of how the U.S. business cycle, its associated monetary policy cycle, and their interaction affects developing countries. The question of North-South linkages is hardly a new one, the role of trade and primary commodity markets in linking developed and developing countries has a long history (see, for instance, Prebisch, 1950 and Singer, 1950) . The links between debtor and creditor nations is also not new (see Diaz-Alejandro, 1984 and Dornbusch, 1985 , Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1993 . Indeed, what is "new" is that some links that had been thought to be extinct have revived in recent years while some "old" links have weakened. As Bordo and Eichengreen (2000) observe, the 1990s shares some of the features of an earlier age of globalization and high capital mobility prior to World War I; namely, portfolio capital flows to emerging markets have re-emerged as an important link between northern lenders and southern borrowers. This revival is particularly pronounced in the larger Latin American countries. Some of the traditional links, however, may have weakened--many countries in Asia and Latin America have successfully diversified their exports away from primary commodities. Hence, terms-of-trade shocks may play (in some cases) a smaller role today than in the past. Both of these observations would suggest that, in general, trade/commodity price links may have weakened while financial links became stronger. However, one must be cautious in interpretation owing to the large variation across countries in the degree of trade and capital market integration. While the share of primary commodities in Mexico's exports has declined dramatically in the past 30 years, the importance of U.S. markets, owing to NAFTA, has soared--suggesting that the trade channel is quantitatively important in the Mexican case. 1 These are the questions we analyze. Our focus is on how developments in the United States affect capital flows and growth in emerging market countries across various regions and country groups.
In the next section, we review the transmissions mechanisms whereby shocks in the North are propagated to the South. In Section III, we present the stylized evidence on how capital flows and growth in the developing countries vary with the business and monetary policy cycle in the United States, while in Section IV we present some basic tests that take a first cut at the data. The final section recaps our main findings.
II. North-South Links
In this section, we discuss various channels through which economic developments in developed countries, particularly the United States, can potentially affect developing economies. 2 On the emerging markets side, our focus is on capital flows--their level and composition--and on economic performance, as measured by GDP growth.
One strand of our analysis focuses on the role of the economic cycle in the United States, while the other focuses on the interest rate cycle.
The Channels of Transmission
Simple trade models suggest that a slowdown in a large developed economy will have adverse consequences on its trading partners, to the extent that the demand for imports in the decelerating economy has a positive income elasticity. The higher the share of exports of the country that are funneled to the country experiencing the economic downturn, the more negative the consequences. On the basis of this channel, for example, Mexico would be far more affected by an economic downturn in the United States than Argentina, since, as of 1999 about 88 percent of all Mexican exports were directed at the U.S. market, while only about 11 percent of Argentina's exports were destined for the United States. 3 Furthermore, the degree of openness (say, as measured by exports to GDP) reinforces the contrast between Argentina and Mexico, with the former being a much more closed economy. Other things being equal, the higher the income elasticity of imports in the developed country, the more pronounced the contraction in the developing country's exports will be. In this regard, developing countries that export predominantly manufactured goods (which typically are more sensitive to income) may fare worse that their counterparts exporting primary commodities, which tend to be relatively income-inelastic. 4 The differences in export structure across developing countries are, indeed, significant. For instance, the contrast between the export structure of East Asian countries (heavily-weighted to manufactures) to that of most African countries (which are predominantly skewed to primary commodities) is particularly striking. 5
The preceding discussion, however, ignores the fact that the business cycle in the world's largest economies may itself exert a significant influence on the terms of trade of 3 The stylized evidence on patterns of trade is discussed in the next session. 4 See, for example, Reinhart (1996) , who estimates industrial countries' import demand function for various regions and countries with varying degrees of export diversification and primary commodity content. 5 For example, manufactures account for only 10 percent in Côte D'Ivoire but account for more than 65 percent of Thai exports. their smaller trading partners--the developing countries, as argued in Dornbusch (1985) .
Perhaps, the most clear example of this comes from international commodity markets.
The literature on commodity price determination has consistently accorded a significant role to the growth performance of the major industrial countries. 6 Recessions in industrial economies, particularly the United States, have historically been associated with weakness in real commodity prices. The implication is, that other things being equal, commodity exporters, who are also hit with an adverse terms-of-trade shock, will suffer more. Finally, a change in real exchange rates among G-3 countries will also have an impact. For example, a depreciation of the U.S. dollar versus the Euro would most benefit countries whose currencies are tied to the U.S. dollar but tend to export to Europe (i.e., Argentina).
Yet, the impacts of fluctuations in the business cycle on developing economies is not limited to the income and relative price effects discussed above. There is a wellestablished, endogenous and countercyclical "monetary policy cycle" in the major developed economies. Central banks ease monetary conditions and reduce interest rates during economic downturns and increase interest rates when signs of overheating develop. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) stressed the importance of U.S. interest rates in driving the international capital flow cycle. They present evidence that, in periods of low interest rates in the United States, central banks in developing countries in Latin America systematically accumulate foreign exchange reserves and that the real exchange rate appreciates--both of these developments are symptoms associated with capital inflows. Subsequent studies, which examined net capital flows, and a variety of their components over various sample periods and incorporated developing countries in other regions found similar evidence. This link between the interest rate and capital flow cycle may arise for a variety of reasons. It may be the case that investors in the developed economies faced with lower interest rates are inclined to seek higher returns elsewhere (i.e., the demand for developing country assets increases). It could also be that the decline in international interest rates makes borrowing less costly for emerging markets and increases the supply of emerging market debt. As illustrated in the interest rate parity condition below, where e denotes the expected change in the exchange rate, the decline in the cost of borrowing for emerging-market countries (i) may be even greater than the decline in international interest rates (i*) if the country risk premia ( ) is itself a positive function of international interest rates.
The evidence presented in Fernandez-Arias (1996) and Frankel et. al. (2000) suggests that the country-risk premia in many emerging markets is indeed affected by international interest rates in a way that amplifies the interest rate cycle in industrial countries. Taken together, these findings would suggest that the trade and finance effects that arise from the growth and interest rate cycles, respectively, in developed economies tend to, at least partially offset. The countries that would benefit the most from the interest rate cycle may well be those that start from a shakier financial position--that is the ones with the higher international debt-to-reserves ratio. This is so because these countries would benefit the most from a decline in debt-servicing costs (possibly also owing to a larger decline in their risk premia) and lose the least in the interest earnings from holding international reserves. For example, a country like China, which has a low level of external debt and a high level of external reserves might even benefit from interest rate increases in the United States--especially if the rate increases are owing to a buoyant economy. For other low-income countries, which have no access to international capital markets under any interest rate scenario, this capital flow-debt servicing channel may not even be present at all. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) , for instance, who analyze the determinants of capital flows to Africa, present evidence that (unlike other regions) capital flows are not systematically affected by changes in international interest rates but are heavily influenced by terms-of-trade fluctuations. 
III. The Role of G-3 Developments: The Stylized Facts
In this section, we present stylized evidence on the "North-South" links we discussed in the preceding section. For emerging markets, we examine international capital flows and growth around various measures of the United States growth and interest rate cycle and contrast periods of high interest rate and exchange rate volatility to those where volatility was relatively subdued. We present evidence on the direction of " North-South" trade and on the impact of industrial country developments on international commodity markets.
Our data is annual and spans 1970 to 1999, the country groupings are those However, the surge in FDI flows from the mid-1990s to the present is a significant departure from FDI's historical behavior and it is, no doubt, heavily influenced by the wave of privatization and mergers and acquisitions that took hold in many emerging markets during recent years. Hence, it is plausible to expect that some of this surge in FDI is non-recurring. Yet, during this period of privatizations and surging FDI, the United States is enjoying its longest economic expansion--which may skew the results toward finding an exaggerated role for U.S. growth in driving FDI and total net flows. To examine whether the "anomalous" FDI surge of the 1990s is responsible for these results, we ended our sample in 1992, which is two years following the only U.S.
recession in the 1990s. The results paint a somewhat different picture--capital flows to emerging markets do not increase as much during economic upturns in the United States.
While FDI flows and portfolio flows continue to be markedly higher in expansions than in recessions, the drop in other flows during expansions almost fully offsets this.
Indeed, truncating the sample reveals that, while FDI and portfolio flows do appear positively related to the U.S. economic cycle (as before), the impact of the economic cycle on these components of private flows is somewhat smaller than that suggested by Figures 1-2 . Yet, the countercyclical behavior of other flows in the smaller sample remains consistent with the results for the entire period. Splitting the sample into years in which U.S. real GDP growth is above the median growth rate for the sample and those in which growth is below the median reveals a similar pattern. primary-commodity exporters. According to the various studies reviewed in Table 4 , a one percentage point drop in industrial production growth in the developed economies results in a drop in real commodity prices of roughly 0.77 to about 2 percent, depending on which study is considered. We conducted the same exercise as for capital flows for emerging market average annual GDP growth. As shown in Table 5 , for all developing countries, growth is somewhat slower during U.S. recessions averaging 4.8 percent per annum versus 5.2 percent average growth during expansion years. However, the pattern is uneven across regions.
For the countries in transition, Asia (including the newly-industrialized economies), and the Middle East and Europe growth tend to slow during U.S. recessions while for Africa and the Western Hemisphere, the opposite is true. However, in most instances the differences across regimes are not markedly different--an issue we will explore further later. 
The Interest Rate-Monetary Policy Cycle
As noted earlier, in a world of countercyclical monetary policy in industrial countries, it is difficult to talk about an economic cycle without analyzing the consequences of the interest rate cycle that, more often than not, goes hand in hand with economic fluctuations. As with the growth cycle, we proceed to describe the stylized evidence by breaking up the sample in two ways. First, we subdivide the 1970-1999 sample into two subsamples, one in which monetary policy was "easing"--that is to say that the federal funds rate was declining--and periods of tightening, when the federal funds rate is rising.
However, this cut of the data does not discriminate between modest and marked policy changes, as a 50 basis point drop in the federal funds rate during a given year would be lumped together with a 400 basis point drop. To get at this issue, we also break the sample into periods when real interest rates are above the sample median and those years when rates are below the median. 9
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of this exercise. Irrespective of whether the observations are split along the lines of rising versus falling interest rates or interest rate levels above or below their median, or whether the sample ends in 1999 or 1992--the outcomes are consistent. In years when U.S. monetary policy is easing (i.e., the federal funds rate is declining), emerging markets in all regions receive a markedly higher volume of capital inflows. While FDI and portfolio flows do not change much, other (short-term) flows respond markedly to the interest rate cycle. 10 9 Our real interest rate measure is constructed by taking the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate and subtracting the consumer price inflation rate for that year. 10 The surge in net private inflows is even more dramatic when the sample is split according to whether real interest rates are above or below their sample median. As before, Africa is the only region unaffected by the interest rate cycle in the United States.
IV. Assessing the Impact of the "North's" Business and Interest Rate Cycles: A First Cut
In the preceding section, we discussed the stylized evidence on capital flows, growth and U.S. developments. In what follows, we take that analysis further by examining the interaction between the "twin" monetary policy-growth cycles and capital flows and its components. would lead to (other things being equal) lower capital flows to emerging markets. On the other hand, while recessions in the North may dampen FDI flows (as these are often linked to trade), economic slowdowns tend to be accompanied by a weakening in the domestic demand for loans--which, in the past, has often led banks to seek lending opportunities abroad. In other words, the consequences of the U.S. cycle for capital flows are, in principle, ambiguous. Notes: Recessions and expansions are dated according to the National Bureau of Economic Research's dating of U.S. business cycle turning points; if six or more months of a given year fall into the recession category, then that year is labeled a recession year. Easing/tightening are those years that the Federal Funds rate declined/rose.
Stylized Evidence on the Twin Cycles

Basic Tests
However, the preceding discussion does not shed light on the relative statistical significance of the twin cycles. To address that issue, we next run a variety of simple regressions that attempt to explain capital flows and growth in emerging markets through developments in the developed economies, particularly the United States. Our sample spans 1970-1999 for all regions except the Western Hemisphere, where the debt crisis (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) period is excluded. 12
The dependent variable is a real private capital flow measure, which includes four categories: Net capital flows, net direct investment, net portfolio flows, and other capital flows. The regressors in the first set of panel regressions are real U.S. GDP growth and the U.S. real interest rate. Neither of these variables poses a potential endogeneity problem, since both are exogenous to other factors affecting developing country growth.
Our estimation method is a simple OLS. Table 9 reports the results of this regression for all emerging market economies as well as for particular regions. 1 Nominal 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate.
As shown in Table 8 , when examining the results for the emerging market aggregate as well as for most of the regional subgroups, the results that predominantly emerge are that U.S. interest rates play a more dominant and systematic role in explaining capital flows to emerging markets than U.S. economic growth--rising U.S. interest rates are associated with falling capital flows to emerging markets. In effect, in many of the regressions the coefficient on growth is negative--suggesting that when the U.S. is enjoying rapid growth--capital stays at home. This effect is most pronounced in Other Net Flows, which largely consists of bank lending. Both FDI flows and portfolio flows are consistently interest rate sensitive. 13
There are, however, various regional differences worth highlighting. 14 First, U.S. real interest rates are significant in explaining portfolio and FDI flows in all regions--but the impacts of real interest rates are greatest in the Western Hemisphere and lowest in Africa. This result may simply highlight that, among the emerging markets with some extent of access to international capital markets (Asia and Latin America) the latter are more heavily indebted and interconnected with the United States. Second, growth in the United States has a significant and positive influence in explaining FDI to the Western Hemisphere--which is not the case for other regions. Third, as the descriptive analysis anticipated, the other capital flow category behaves very differently from FDI and portfolio flows.
We next perform a comparable exercise for growth. Dornbusch (1985) in assessing the links between developing debtor countries and their developed counterparts performed a similar exercise. The dependent variable was developing country GDP growth (as is the case here) while the independent variable was a measure of OECD growth. 15 He found the coefficient on the OECD growth measure to be statistically significant and in the 0.28-0.76 range. More recently, Frankel and Roubini (2000) regress developing country growth for various regional groupings against the G-7 real interest rate; they found that the coefficients on real interest rates were negative and in most cases statistically significant--with the greatest interest sensitivity in the Western Hemisphere. 16 13 Similar results obtain, when developed-country real GDP growth rates are used in lieu of the U.S. growth rate. These results are not reported but are available from the authors. 14 This discussion is based on Appendix Tables 1-2. 15 He used industrial production, real GDP growth, and import volume alternatively; the sample was 1961-84. 16 The coefficient for Western Hemisphere was -0.77 compared to -0.39 for all market borrowers.
Our exercise here combines these two approaches. As shown in Table 9 
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have not attempted to predict the fate of the U.S. economy but rather to analyze and quantify how developments in the United States have affected emerging market economies in the past. As regards the impact of the U.S. economic and interest rate cycle, our main findings can be summarized as follows.
Recessions in the United States are associated with a lower volume of capital flows to emerging markets; FDI flows are particularly sensitive to the growth cycle. Other capital flows (which include bank lending and capital flight), however, behave countercyclically--as banks seek to lend abroad as U.S. loan demand weakens during recessions. This offset has, at least historically, cushioned the blow.
Other things being equal, lower U.S. real GDP growth is also associated with lower growth in developing countries. The difference in U.S. GDP growth rates between expansion and recession years is 3.3 percent. 17 Hence, in an "average" U.S. recession, the slowdown alone would shave about 3/5 percent off growth in developing countries GDP growth (Table 10) . However, some regions like the Western Hemisphere and the newly industrialized economies of Asia would be hit harder. country category (Table 11 ) and considerably more for the relatively indebted nations of the Western Hemisphere (which maintain access to international capital markets).
However, "double-whammies," recessions coupled with tight money, are unambiguously terrible news for the developing world. Total capital flows to emerging markets are less than one half their level of the "boom" (expansions coupled with easings). The interest rate cycle and monetary policy cycle re-enforce with its amplified consequences for growth. Indeed, the last double whammy in our sample sets the stage for the debt crisis in Latin America and elsewhere in the early 1980s. The probability of a double whammy has, at least historically, been tied to the inflation performance on the United States. A banking or financial crisis in the United States could conceivably lead to the same outcome.
Finally, if FDI is the most stable and desirable of capital flows from an emerging market perspective and if international bank lending is volatile and more prone to sudden reversals (as was the case with Japanese bank lending to emerging Asia during the crisis)--then a recession in the United States has, at least historically, resulted in a "deterioration" in the composition of the capital flows emerging markets receive. FDI shrinks in recessions while bank lending fills up some of that space. 1970-1999 (continued) 
